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Evolution	in	the	brain,	Evolution	in	the	
Mind:	John	Hughlings	Jackson	and	the	
Origins	of	Psychoanalysis	(and	of	
Neuropsychoanalysis)	
 
 
Abstract: 
This article first aims to demonstrate the different ways the work of the English 
Neurologist John Hughlings Jackson has influenced Freud. It will be argued that 
these can be summarised in five points. It is further argued that the framework 
proposed by Jackson continued to be pursued by 20th century neuroscientists such 
as Papez, MacLean and Panksepp into tripartite hierarchical evolutionary models. 
Finally, the account presented here will shed some light on the similarities 
encountered by neuropsychoanalytic researchers between contemporary accounts 
of the anatomy and physiology of the nervous systems on the one hand, and of 
Freudian models of the mind at the other. These, I will demonstrate, are more than 
similarities. They have a historical underpinning to them, as both accounts originate 
from one common source: John Hughlings Jackson’s tripartite evolutionary 
hierarchic view of the brain. 
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As new methodologies for the neural sciences were developed throughout the 20th 
century, thus allowing researchers to study the underlying physiology of complex 
phenomena that were previously almost exclusively studied by psychoanalysis, a 
branch of researchers with a psychoanalytic or psychodynamic theoretical 
background have progressively developed an interest in these methods as a means 
of testing their own theories. This is illustrated by the increasing popularity of the 
neuropsychoanalytic movement (for a review, see Fotopoulou et al. 2013; Mancia 
2006; Leuzinger-Bohleber et al. 1998), as well as by a growing body of clinical and 
conceptual studies that uses neuroscientific methods as to test psychoanalytic 
theories1. The interdisciplinary enterprise counts today, in fact, with two journals 
solely devoted to the field2, as well with an international society. 
However fruitful this interdisciplinary project proves to be, it has also brought much 
conceptual confusion, as it would be expected from disciplines that developed 
almost completely independently for over a century. This has generated extensive 
debate – sometimes of a heated nature (Cf. Blass & Carmeli 2015; Blass & Carmeli 
2007; Yovell et al. 2015; Mancia 2007; Pugh 2007; Ramus 2013). Possibly driven as 
a means of clarifying its epistemological framework, the interest in the origins of 
psychoanalysis, and particularly in Freud’s scientific beginnings and early influences, 
has again become the focus of historical research in recent years.  
One such example is found in the work of the founder of the neuropsychoanalytic 
movement, the neuropsychologist and psychoanalyst Mark Solms. In his initial 
writings, Solms first delved into the prehistory of psychoanalysis  (Solms, 2000a, 
                                                          
1
 The Neuropsychoanalysis Association maintains a long and updated list of studies in https://npsa-
association.org/education-training/suggested-reading/ 
 
2
 ‘Neuropsychoanalysis’ and ‘Frontiers in Psychoanalysis and Neurosciences’ 
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2000b, Solms & Saling, 1986, 1990) before engaging into work aiming to combine 
both fields (Solms, 2014; Solms & Panksepp, 2012; Solms & Turnbull, 2002; Zellner, 
Watt, Solms, & Panksepp, 2011).  In his words: 
 
I want first of all to take you backward into history, to trace the origins 
of psychoanalysis to a particular branch of neuroscience, and to show 
you how the psychoanalytic method grew out of that branch; then I 
want to trace subsequent developments in that field to show you that it 
still remains the natural point of contact between our two disciplines. In 
the process, I hope to be able to demonstrate that – just as we find in 
our clinical work – a problem, which seems insolubly complex in its 
present, mature form, frequently turns out to have a relatively 
simple structure when one traces it back to its origins (Solms 2001 
p.180). 
 
We see here an instance where the historiographic work in psychoanalysis serves as 
a preliminary stage in a determinate project, i.e., that of demonstrating that 1) 
psychoanalytic ideas (in particular the models of the mind) have their origins in the 
neurosciences and are still influenced by them; 2) that because of this common 
origin, shared ideas in the disciplines developed in parallel; and foremost 3) that 
because of this parallel development, the disciplines can be joint together again in 
the present.  
Solms is not alone in this enterprise. Another notable example is found in the work of 
George Makari. As the historian Patricia Cotti argued in her extensive review of 
Makari’s book (2008) for this journal, ‘history, depending on how it is told, can permit 
or not the realization of the scientific potential of psychoanalysis’ (Cotti 2012 p.145). 
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In this line, both Makari and Solms can be thought as ‘developing a new 
historiography, [which] repositions psychoanalysis among the sciences’ (ibid., 
p.134). The present paper may be understood as in line with this particular approach 
to the history of psychoanalysis as regards the two first points, while leaving the third 
one as an open-question.  
Amongst the early influences, the work of one author seem to have raised particular 
interest in scholars, partly due to the wide influence of his constructs in central 
psychoanalytic ideas, and partly due to his influence being still relatively unexplored. 
John Hughlings Jackson (1835-1911), ‘the father of English neurology’ (Critchley & 
Critchley, 1998), was a talented neurologist and neuropathologist who is today best 
remembered for his contributions to the understanding of epilepsy and for co-
founding Brain: A Journal of Neurology, still today one of the most influential in the 
field. His name is also attached to the description of a characteristic symptom in 
focal motor seizures (“the Jacksonian March”) and to a type of psychomotor seizure 
of the temporal lobe (“Jacksonian Seizure”). But more than a neurologist, Jackson 
demonstrated in his writings a talent for philosophy – a field for which he almost 
abandoned medicine early in his career (Hutchinson, 1911) – and in particular 
epistemology and philosophy of mind (c.f. Jacyna, 2011; Smith, 1982). 
Scholars have collectively singled out five main areas where Jackson has influenced 
Freud. First, it has provided Freud, while still a researcher in neurology, with a 
dynamic framework of the functioning of the nervous system that sharply contrasted 
with the Austro-German School of which he was originally affiliated, and which was 
consistent with his empirical findings (Solms & Saling, 1986, 1990). Secondly, 
Jackson provided Freud with a theory on the relation between mind and brain that 
would prove capital in his distanciation from neurology and development of a pure 
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psychology (Fullinwider, 1983; Makari, 2008; Solms & Saling, 1986; Stengel, 1963). 
Further on, the hierarchy of the nervous system proposed by Jackson, based on 
Spencerian ideas, would also provide Freud with the central tenets for his 
hierarchical models of the mind (both the topic and the structural) (Modell, 2000; 
Wiest, 2012). Freud’s theories on regression and repression also bear many 
similarities with Jackson’s, and can be understood as a consequence of this 
hierarchical perspective on brain evolution (Fullinwider, 1983; S. W. Jackson, 1969; 
Linn, 1960; Stengel, 1963; Sulloway, 1979, pp. 270–2). Lastly, in a previous paper, I 
also explored the influence of Spencerian and Jacksonian ideas on evolution in 
Freud’s social theories (Niro Nascimento, in press). 
Although the collective effort of scholars demonstrates the relevance of Jacksonian 
ideas for Freud, to my best knowledge, all contributions so far have focused on only 
one or two of these points and no work has yet collected them all together. Given the 
pivotal role played by the English neurologist, it is an important and valuable task to 
aggregate and summarise these findings so that we can better evaluate not only the 
historical but also the contemporary relevance of his work for psychoanalysis, and in 
particular for a better understanding of the neuropsychoanalytic project, which I will 
try to demonstrate in the second half of the paper.  
However, in order to properly grasp the influence Hughlings Jackson’s work had for 
psychoanalysis, we must first begin by revisiting Freud’s medical education so as to 
contextualize the problems he was addressing at the time.  
Comment [NL1]: Insert Jacques Nassif: 
‘penser Charcot avec Jackson, et Jackson 
en function the Charcot’. 
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Freud’s Medical Education 
 
After having worked in the physiological laboratory of Ernst Brücke (1819-1892) for 
almost seven years, between 1876 and 1882, a period also deeply influential to his 
psychoanalytical work but outside of the scope of this paper (cf. Amacher, 1965; 
Bernfeld, 1944, 1949), Freud was advised by Brücke to give up his hopes in attaining 
a salaried position at the department and move over to a private clinical practice so 
as to earn a living and be able to fulfil his long desire to marry his fiancée (Freud, 
1925). Following this advice, he joined the General Hospital of Vienna in 1882 
initially as an Aspirant (an unsalaried position). He completed internships in surgery, 
internal medicine (under Hermann Nothnagel), psychiatry (Theodor Meynert), 
dermatology (Hermann von Zeissl), and neurology (Franz Scholz), being promoted in 
1883 to Sekundarartzt in the psychiatric department led by Theodor Meynert (1833-
1892), where he worked until 1886 (Guenther, 2012). Under Meynert, Freud would 
study the human nervous system – he had so far with Brücke studied solely lower 
vertebrates (Freud, 1877a, 1877b, 1878) –, and in particularly the spinal cord and 
medulla oblongata (Freud, 1884, 1886a, 1886b, 1888; Freud & Ossipowit, 1886). 
It is worth noting that at the turn of the century the fields of neurology and psychiatry 
hadn’t yet taken on the shape by which we know them today. Until the eighteenth 
century specialization in medicine was poorly perceived by both the general public 
and medical establishment, and didn’t start taking place until the early nineteenth 
century as the number of general practitioners increased and doctors had to find a 
way of standing out from the competition (Scull 2011, 72).  Specialization would not 
reach psychiatry until the mid to late nineteenth century, as the alienists or mad-
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doctors progressively moved away from the asylums and into private practice for the 
middle and affluent classes (Scull 2015, 260ff). In German-speaking countries, 
psychiatry moved into academia with the appointment of Wilhelm Griesinger (1817-
1868) in Berlin as professor of psychiatry in 1865. Griesinger sought to emulate the 
approach that put German general medicine into the forefront by positing the unity of 
mind and brain – and thus of psychiatric and neurologic illnesses – which set the 
research framework for the next generation for names like Alois Alzheimer, Emil 
Kraepelin and Theodor Meynert (Guenther, 2012, 2015; Hirschmüller, 1991; Lesky, 
1965). This approach helped raise the field to new levels of recognition in the 
scientific community, which in turn led professionals abroad to adopt the German title 
for the new specialty – Psychiatrie – in order to profit from the newly acquired 
credibility.  
With Meynert’s appointment as chair of psychiatry in Vienna in 1870, basic research 
in neuroanatomy was placed centre stage, even more pronouncedly than in other 
German-speaking universities. Psychotherapy and clinical work were put into 
secondary place for research into the localisation of neurological causes of 
psychiatric and neurological impairments (cf. Guenther, 2012, 2015; Hirschmüller, 
1991; Lesky, 1965). By the time Freud joined the psychiatric clinic, Theodor Meynert 
was one of the most influential neuroanatomists in the world, having developed a 
model of the global functioning of the nervous system that strictly correlated 
psychical functions with anatomical locations in the brain. In his model, the nervous 
system was thought of as organised in the shape of a multi-tentacled cephalopod (‘a 
Mollusca’), where the body of the animal was the cortex, and the tentacles were 
afferent and efferent nerve fibres connecting the cortex to the sense organs. For 
Meynert, the cortex, ‘the seat of the soul’ (Meynert, 1892a, p. 10), was a ‘tabula rasa’ 
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(Meynert, 1884, p. 141) – on which sensation was imprinted and associated. In this 
cortico-centric framework, all psychical processes are cortical – subcortical 
structures were believed to be innate and have only the function of passive (i.e., 
reflexive) transmission.  
In Meynert’s view, sensations was are transmitted unmodified from the sensory 
organs to the cortex – he used the term projection, and a projection is nothing but a 
copy –, where, following the corollary of English associationist psychology, they areit 
is associated with other sensations via association bundles, thus forming ideas, 
which are finally discharged through afferent fibres leading to motor innervations. 
Meynert and his followers, such as Carl Wernicke and Ludwig Lichtheim, used this 
model as basis for research aiming to localise complex psychological faculties, and 
language in particular, to specific areas of the brain. Meynert even indicates in a 
number of passages that not only are representations localized within specific 
cortical areas (ibid., p.140) but also within neurons (Meynert, 1884, p. 152, 1892b, p. 
24). 
 
This model would be the subject of Freud’s criticism in three works – his 1887 
unpublished manuscript Critical Introduction to Neuropathology, the 1888 dictionary 
article Gehirn (Brain), and his 1891 monograph On Aphasias. Freud’s criticism is 
concentrated on two points, central to this overly simplified localisationist framework. 
He first demonstrated, based on his previous anatomical studies of the spinal cord 
and medulla (Freud, 1882, 1884, 1886a, 1886b; Freud & Darkschewitsch, 1886; 
Freud & Ossipowit, 1886) that, contrary to Meynert’s beliefs, the cortex is not directly 
connected to the periphery. He proves this by showing that the fibres stemming from 
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the sensory organs are occasionally disrupted in nuclei of grey matter, where they 
are involved in a complex interconnection with fibres arriving from other sources. 
Thus, he concluded, some other form of transmission must occur, and he had 
reason to believe that these structures played an active role, integrating and thus 
functionally changing sensory information as they carried it. The nervous system was 
thus not simply a passive carrier of sensation, but an active organiser. This led him 
to conclude that the periphery must be contained in the cortex not as a projection 
(Projektion), but as a representation (Repräsentation), i.e., not in an exact 
topographical map, but as a functional rearrangement: 
 
‘‘For Meynert, who in describing pathways is mainly concerned with 
their cortical connections, a fibre or a fibre tract retains its identity even 
after having passed through an unlimited number of nuclei. This is 
indicated by his phrase: “the fibre passes through a grey substance”. 
This naturally gives rise to the impression that the fibre remains the 
same on its long way to the cortex […]. This view can no longer be 
maintained. [...] If we follow the course of a sensory afferent tract as we 
know it, and if we regard its frequent interruptions in grey nuclei and its 
arborisations through them as characteristic, we cannot but assume 
that the functional significance of a fibre on its way to the cerebral 
cortex has changed each time it has emerged from such a nucleus [...] 
We can only presume that the fibre tracts, which reach the cerebral 
cortex after their passage through other grey masses, have maintained 
some relationship to the periphery of the body, but no longer a 
topographically exact image of it. (Freud, 1891, pp. 52–4) 
 
Next, Freud criticiszed Meynert’s conflation of physiology and psychology. 'In 
psychology’, Freud wrote, ‘the simple idea is for us something elementary which we 
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can sharply distinguish from its connections with other ideas. Thus we are led to 
believe that their physiological correlate, the modification occurred in the centre by 
the excited nerve fibre endings, is also something simple, which can be localized at 
one point. Such a transfer is of course totally unauthorized' (1891, p. 57). Thus, for 
the Freud from 1891, physiology and psychology operate at different levels of 
explanation, using different languages, that cannot be equated. The best one can do 
is to establish correlations, but, due to the nature of the object studied, these are not 
static but of a dynamic nature. Thus even though a psychological faculty – for 
instance, language – can be said to be located in the brain, this doesn’t mean that it 
is found in a single simple anatomical location. Different parts of the brain would 
have different and distinct roles in underpinning what is experienced on a 
psychological level as a single and unified phenomenon. Such an approach can be 
understood as the forefather of the notion of distributed processing, now a central 
tenet of the neural sciences (Kandel & Schwartz, 2013). 
Therefore, what Freud needed to complete his criticism of Meynert’s model was a 
new framework in which (1) the cortex is not perceived as central and directly 
connected to the periphery, and (2) that separated the realms of physiology and 
psychology. Until the publication of Gehirn, in 1888, he didn’t have available such a 
model to replace Meynert’s. Thus, in this work, his critique remains only negative, 
and he is obliged to state that ‘at the present, the Meynert scheme is not to be 
replaced by another’ (Freud, 1888, p.58). Such a framework would be provided by 
his reading of Hughlings Jackson, and the result was presented in his monograph 
On Aphasias, three years later. 
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Hughlings Jackson and the hierarchical organization of the nervous 
system 
 
Jackson’s evolutionary hierarchy of the nervous system is based on Spencer’s initial 
insight that ‘if the doctrine of evolution is true, the inevitable implication is that Mind 
can be understood only by observing how Mind is evolved’  (Spencer, 1869, p. 291).  
Spencer’s Synthetic Philosophy was founded on the idea of a natural law of 
evolution, which in its most simple form stated that ‘all things are growing or 
decaying, accumulating matter or wearing away, integrating or disintegrating’ 
(Spencer, 1897, p. 292). This fragment, however, conceals the arrow of nature: 
progress. This, for him – borrowing the notion from the German embryologist Karl 
Ernst von Baer (1792-1876) –, consists of the passage from the homogeneous to the 
heterogeneous, from the simple to the complex. And for Spencer, though regression 
and dissolution into simpler forms does occur under special circumstances, 
evolution, heterogeneity, complexity and progress are the rule rather than the 
exception in the grand scheme of things: 
 
‘this law of organic progress is the law of all progress. Whether it be in 
the development of the Earth, in the development of Life upon its 
surface, in the development of Society, of Government, of 
Manufactures, of Commerce, of Language, Literature, Science, Art, this 
same evolution of the simple into the complex, through successive 
differentiations, holds throughout’ (Spencer, 1857, p. 10) 
  
The influence of Spencer’s ideas in Hughlings Jackson’s work has already been ably 
treated in length by Smith and others (Franz & Gillett, 2011; Jacyna, 2011; Lopez 
Pinero, 2010; Smith, 1982a, 1982b; George K York & Steinberg, 2002; Young, 
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1990), so I shall not delve into the topic in greater length. But it is worth remarking 
that the influence was openly and repeatedly emphasised by Hughlings Jackson 
himself: ‘I need scarcely mention the name of Herbert Spencer, except to express 
my vast indebtedness to him’ (1932, p. 395).  
Jackson’s model differs from the localizationist model of Meynert in a number of 
ways. First, he conceptualized the nervous system as a sensorimotor machine, 
functioning according to the law of reflex action, and solely responsible for the 
observable events of movement and sensation. This aimed at freeing neurology from 
psychological concepts, clearing up the epistemological confusion that permeated 
the ‘psychologico-materialist theories’ (ibid., p. 28) such as that of the German 
school. In his words, ‘there is no physiology of the mind any more than there is 
psychology of the nervous system’ (1890, p. 7). Such theories, he argued, were ‘not 
really clear: they hinder progress in neurology’ (1932, p. 28). Although he decided to 
remain exclusively in the field of neurology, with this reformulation he has also 
removed the necessity for psychology to have recourse to physiology, thus allowing 
researchers such as Freud to build models of the mind based exclusively on 
psychological methods. 
Secondly, and most important for our purposes, rather than mapping the cortex as 
the focal point of the entire nervous system as did Meynert did, Jackson portrays it 
the brain in terms of an organizational hierarchy with increased complexity. 
Influenced particularly by Herbert Spencer, who as noted before understood the 
process of evolution as consisting of the passage from the homogeneous to the 
heterogeneous and from the simple to the complex (Spencer, 1897), Jackson 
divided the system into three levels, reflecting different stages of complexity in the 
evolution of the species. Lower centres, mainly subcortical, were thought to be 
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responsible for representing each body part in a very simple – i.e., point by point –, 
but uncoordinated fashion. Middle centres re-represent these parts in more complex 
combinations, thus increasing its co-ordination (J. H. Jackson, 1932, p. 100). Finally, 
he attributes to the highest centres, in the frontal and lateral lobes, the task of re-re-
representing with the greatest complexity the body parts, giving way to complex 
phenomena such as the whole body, cognition and consciousness. He went so as 
far as to assume that the re-re-representation of the heart was the ‘physical basis of 
the time constant’ (ibid.: 102).  
The passage from the lower to the higher is accompanied, as we see, not just by 
increasing complexity and heterogeneity, but also by increased integration. The 
highest levels, in this sense, are ‘potentially the whole organism; the whole organism 
is “potentially present” in them. They are the unifying centres of the whole organism, 
and thus the centres whereby the organism as a whole is adjusted to the 
environment’ (J. H. Jackson, 1932, p. 82). A higher strata is more complex because 
it integrates excitation from various centres from below, thus allowing it to increase 
its malleability and adaptation to the environment, providing us with less 
stereotypical responses. Thus for him (and echoing Spencer):  
 
‘(1) Evolution is a passage from the most to the least organised. 
“Highly organised” is frequently used synonymously with ‘very 
complex’; but by degrees of organisation I mean degrees of perfection 
of union and certainty of action of nervous elements with one another. 
Using the term organised in this sense I say that the highest cerebral 
centres are the least organised (the “most helpless centres”), although 
they are the most complex, whereas the lowest centres are the most 
organised, although the least complex. In other words, we may say (2) 
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that the evolutionary ascent is from the least to the most modifiable. If 
the highest centres were not modifiable, we should be very simple 
machines; we should make no new acquirements. If the lowest (“vital”) 
centres were to become modifiable as the highest are, life would 
cease’ (J. H. Jackson, 1932, p. 395) 
 
The dynamic aspect of Jackson’s model lies in that the fact that the higher levels are 
responsible not only for generating events themselves but also for inhibiting 
excitation arriving from the lower portion. In fact, cohesion and integration at the 
upper levels are achieved via inhibition and modulations of the lower strata. The 
higher level could in this sense propagate or inhibit stimulation from the lower 
centres so as to generate more adapted responses. This helped explain the 
appearance of positive symptoms after brain damage, when only negative symptoms 
were expected to occur – this happened, according to Jackson, because once the 
functioning of a higher layer was lost, reflexes generated in the lower levels that 
were previously inhibited were now liberated to be expressed. The same structure 
was believed to operate in mental disorders; when a higher level lost its function, 
medium and lower process continued to function normally, leading to positive 
symptoms such as delusions and hallucinations. Thus symptoms can be seen as 
lower levels functioning without upper inhibitory or modulatory control (J. H. Jackson, 
1932, p. 50). 
Regarding the contemporary discussion on the localisation of psychological 
functions, Jackson developed a mid-stance position, between equipotentialism and 
localisationism. Equipotentialism, which Jackson called Universalisation (1932, p. 
385), is the theory according to which the brain has no specialised areas. 
Impairments, in this sense, are thought of as a result simply of the volume of brain 
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mass damaged, rather than of the location of the damage. Localisationism, on the 
other hand, as in Meynert’s model, argues that each location is responsible for a 
single function. Gall’s phrenology, in this sense, was the most extreme version of the 
localizationist tradition, while Flourens’ equipotentialism stood for the other extreme. 
By the time Freud started working at the University of Vienna, such extreme 
positions in any of the traditions had become relics of the past. The discussion now 
centrered on whether the brain was composed of different centres responsible for 
elementary psychological functions, whereas complex functions were the result of 
associations between such centres, or if there were no such centres at all – the 
whole brain was nothing but an association machine. Zentrenlehre, or doctrine of 
centres, was the name given in Germany to the first side of the debate. Opponents 
such as K. Jaspers and A. Meyer described the doctrine as a Hirnmythologie – a 
mythology of the brain3.  
As the studies on brain lesions showed, there was indeed a correlation between the 
site of the lesion and the loss of particular functions, such as speech, but these were 
neither exclusive nor completely accurate. Different patients with very similar 
damages still presented different types of function-loss. Jackson thought this meant 
that the representations of the body or psychical faculties in the nervous system 
must have different weightings, so that no function is represented exclusively at one 
single anatomical location. Representations are thus not located in centres, as the 
Zentrenlehre, such as that presented in the Meynertian doctrine, lead us to believe: 
 
                                                          
3
 On this Jaspers says: ‘These anatomical constructions […] became quite fantastic (e.g. Meynert, Wernicke) 
and have rightly been called “Brain Mythologies.” Unrelated things were forcibly related, e.g. cortical cells 
were related to memory [Erinnerungsbild], nerve fibers to association of ideas. Such somatic constructions 
have no real basis. Not one specific cerebral process is known which parallels a specific psychic phenomenon’ 
(Jaspers in Guenther, 2015, p. 13) 
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‘I do not believe that words or syllables have nervous arrangements in 
the sense that there is one little nervous centre for each syllable or 
rather single articulation [...] I believe that each unit of every nervous 
centre is the whole of that nervous centre in (different) miniature. [...] 
But a certain quantity of nervous arrangements, implying a certain 
quantity of energy, is required for every operation’ (J. H. Jackson, 
1879, p. 333, my italics). 
 
This view helped explain the plasticity found on patients with brain lesions, who, 
even though they still missed the respective brain part that first led to the loss of 
function, sometimes could recover the function partially or even completely (J. H. 
Jackson, 1879a, p. 203). Moreover, Jackson thought it was possible that some 
symptoms generated after a lesion (in particular ‘positive symptoms’, i.e., increased 
activity) could be caused by the ‘release’ the inhibitory effects of the lost area. In 
sum, Jackson warned his colleagues that localisation of function and localisation of 
symptoms were not identical. (Finger, 2001, p. 56ff).  
The nervous system thus – in Jackson’s framework – functions dynamically, 
changing its own operation according to its circumstances. If ‘each unit of every 
nervous centre is the whole of that nervous centre in miniature’, when a unit more 
directly related to a certain function is impaired, other units which formerly had lower 
weighting in the execution of the function are capable of compensating for the loss, 
as long as the amount of energy left is still enough for the operation. Jackson called 
this the Principle of Compensation (J. H. Jackson, 1876). That is, Jackson develops 
a mid-stance position between equipotentialism and localisationism by arguing that 
although brain areas do become specialised for certain functions, this is not a rigid 
process. The function itself is shared amongst a range of other areas that have lower 
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participation in the function, but that could take over the function should the main 
area be compromised. 
Jackson repeatedly uses the analogy of the brain as a highly developed bureaucracy 
– either the government of a nation (1932, pp. 22, 58) or the command structure of 
the navy (ibid., p.55). It is important to recognize that Jackson’s analogies are with 
committees, not with a single autocratic ruler: ‘there is no autocratic mind sitting at 
the top to receive sensations as a sort of raw material, out of which to manufacture 
ideas, etc.’ (ibid., p.97-8). When one member of the admiralty board is indisposed, 
the other twenty-three, he says, compensate by working a little harder and the navy 
functions nearly as well as usual. If, however, the entire higher command is removed 
by an enemy action or a gunpowder plot, the consequences are likely to be serious. 
The state or the navy is now controlled by the next-highest level in the command 
structure. This level does the best it can, but through either lack of training or 
breakdown in communication, is unlikely to govern as expertly as the defunct 
uppermost stratum. The best that this lower level is able to achieve is probably 
comparatively poorly adapted to the prevailing circumstances. These poorly adapted 
responses are, for Jackson, nevertheless the “fittest states” of which the reduced 
organization (brain) is capable (Smith, 1982b, p. 252). The metaphor however does 
not imply that Jackson was subscribing to a form of neurological homunculism. The 
centres are mechanisms, each level below more simple and rigid. Therefore, it is the 
hierarchical architectonics of the nervous system – and not a special quality of the 
units in the higher levels in themselves – that generate increasing complexity and 
flexibility. Jackson here provides a hierarchical account not so distant from that 
presented more recently by the philosopher Daniel Dennett (Dennett, 1969, 1993, 
1996). 
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A similar explanatory structure was used to account for hallucinations accompanying 
some post-epileptic patients. ‘The consciousness of the neurological patient is the 
consciousness of the lower regions of the brain, which have been uncovered by 
progressive inactivation of the higher levels. What we term “hallucination” and the 
like is the best effort of these lower strata to make sense of the information input, it is 
the fittest state of the lower level’ (J. H. Jackson, 1932, p. 47). Consciousness being 
a function of the highest layers, and the highest layers being potentially a re-
representation of whole body, if a higher layer suffers some damage – structural or 
functional – consciousness becomes a function of the now highest level. However, 
as the centres at that level may not be fully suited to integrate stimuli from all other 
centres, it may incur in incoherencies caused by lack of inhibition and integration. 
 
Freud and Hughlings Jackson 
 
In “On Aphasia”, Freud explicitly follows a very similar view of the brain as 
hierarchically composed through successive evolutionary stages:  
 
"The whole organization of the brain seems to fall into two central 
apparatuses of which the cerebral cortex is the younger, while the older 
one is represented by the ganglia of the forebrain4 which have still 
maintained some of their phylogenetically old original functions" 
… 
"Of the large subcortical nuclei, only the optic thalamus is connected 
with the cerebral cortex; it is atrophic in cases of congenital 
                                                          
4
 Freud is probably referring to the basal ganglia, as he mentions the striatum in the previous paragraph. 
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malformation of the cerebral cortex; the striate body, however, remains 
intact in cases of lobar degeneration, while it is found to be atrophic in 
patients with congenital cerebellar atrophy. Thus a formidable portion 
of the brain, i.e., the corpora striata, the pons and the cerebellum, can 
be differentiated, as an organ of unknown functions, from the rest of 
the brain with which it has a great many connections, though 
developmentally and functionally it is fairly independent of it" (Freud, 
1891, pp. 49–50) 
 
Here we see that Freud understood the central nervous system as composed of two 
semi-independent structures; the phylogenetically younger cortex, and a subcortical 
and more ancient area, stretching from the basal ganglia to the pons. This 
evolutionary hierarchical understanding of the brain becomes an essential element, 
as we will see, of his models of the mind. 
Freud however in ‘On Aphasia’ presents little on the top-down regulation of basal 
strata. This would be included in his unpublished ‘Project’, from 1895. There, Freud 
would hypothesise how primary process mechanisms give path to secondary 
process via delayed gratification and interaction with reality, which takes place via a 
theory of learning also presented there. Even before the Project, however, Freud 
already gave the topic some attention. In 1893, in a paper on the topic of childhood 
diplegia (Accardo, 1982), Freud again applied Jackson’s theory of hierarchical levels 
– this time in the motor system –, while stressing the notion of dissolution to interpret 
the deficits as the consequence of deficient central inhibition.  
In the Project, Freud for the first time attempts to describe the functioning of the 
whole brain. He once again takes a developmental approach to the understanding of 
the differentiation of functions in the brain, which, he argues, is ‘like everything else, 
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something that has come about gradually’ (Freud, 1895, p. 302). These are initially 
based, Freud implies there, in the brain’s hierarchical anatomy. He follows a very 
similar distinction between lower and higher structures as previously presented in his 
Aphasia monograph: 
 
In fact we know from anatomy a system of neurones (the grey matter of 
the spinal cord) which is alone in contact with the external world, and a 
superimposed system (the grey matter of the brain) which has no 
peripheral connections but to which the development of the nervous 
system and the psychical functions are attached (ibid., p.303) 
 
Freud here calls this lower system the ‘primary brain’, and argues that because it is 
directly connected to the interior of the body and shut off from the external world, it 
should be understood as a ‘sympathetic organ’ – i.e., responsible for signalling the 
body’s ‘endogenous excitations’ (ibid., p.302). An increase in excitation, Freud says, 
is experienced as painful or unpleasurable, while pleasurable sensations are the 
subjective side of a quantitative experience of pacification. The pacification of the  
endogenous sources of excitations, in turn, can only be brought about by an 
‘alteration in the external world (supply of nourishment, proximity of the sexual 
object)’, which requires a ‘specific action’, such as feeding or nurturing. At first, ‘the 
human organism is incapable of bringing about the specific action. It takes place by 
extraneous help, when the attention of an experienced person is drawn to the child's 
state by discharge along the path of internal change’ (ibid., p.318). This constitutes 
the first ‘experience of satisfaction’ of the infant, who is now capable, via a ‘basic law 
of association by simultaneity’, of associating linking the wish (satisfaction) with the 
object that pacifies its wishes (specific action). As the association is one of memory 
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(memory of the experience of satisfaction being contiguous with the experience of 
the specific action), when an increase in endogenous excitation occurs again, thus 
generating a wish, it triggers a wishful activation of memory traces, which in turns 
produces the ‘same thing as a perception – namely a hallucination’, i.e., a fantasy of 
wishfulfillment (ibid., p.319). As more memory traces are gathered, the totality of 
these associations generates a specific form of organisation, responsible for the 
secondary function of the brain. This organisation is what Freud calls the ego. The 
ego is therefore this ‘network of cathected neurones well facilitated in relation to one 
another’, i.e., an organisation of neurons generated via multiple experiences of 
associative learning. 
Freud further argues that the neurons themselves are incapable of differentiating 
between memory and perception, which is why hallucinations, dreams and 
symptoms are experienced so vividly. It is only with the emergence of the secondary 
process inhibitory activity of the ego that such a differentiation is effected. It is 
therefore ‘the inhibition by the ego which makes possible a criterion for distinguishing 
between perception and memory’ (p.326). This is why Freud claims that ‘if an ego 
exists, it must inhibit psychical primary processes’ (p.324). This mechanism provides 
the brain with ‘indications of reality’, which allows it to learn and make use of reality 
as to satisfy its urges. Therefore, Freud provides his reader here with a model by 
which the higher levels of the brain learn to inhibit and regulate the bottom layers, 
and hereby integrating the system into a coordinated whole (i.e., the ego) that learns 
to employ the body to act on the environment as a means to satisfy its wishes. 
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If the lower levels are remnants of more primitive stages of evolution, and brain 
damage in the upper levels ‘releases’ the effect of those stages, Jackson 
conjectured that disorders operate in a process opposite to evolution. He called this 
process dissolution, again influenced by Spencer (Spencer, 1869). There is clear a 
parallel here with Freudian notions. Freudian nosology is based on the idea of 
regression – i.e., the set of symptoms of each disorder is explained by the stage of 
psychic development to which the patient has regressed:  
 
‘The flight from unsatisfactory reality into what, on account of the 
biological damage involved, we call illness, [...] takes place along the 
path of involution, of regression, of a return to earlier phases of sexual 
life, phases from which at one time satisfaction was not withheld’ 
(Freud, 1910, p. 48) 
 
The narcissistic neuroses (psychosis in general), for example, represent in Freud’s 
theory a partial regression to the stage of primary narcissism (Freud, 1911). The 
following passage by Ferenczi, Freud’s greater collaborator in the 1910’s and with 
whom he most freely discussed speculative analogies between individual, social and  
phylogenetic development5, makes the argument particularly clear: 
 
‘[W]e suspect that the wish-constituent of the neurosis, [...] depends on 
where the fixation-point is in the phase of the development of the 
sexual hunger, while the mechanism of the neuroses is probably 
decided by what stage in the development of the ego the individual is in 
                                                          
5
 Freud’s unpublished and highly speculative metapsychological manuscript on the transference neuroses – his 
‘Philogenetic Phantasy’ (Freud, 1987) –, for instance, was discovered by the historian Ilse Grubrich-Simitis 
amongst the Ferenczi literary estate (Grubrich-Simitis, 1988). 
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at the time of the determining inhibition. It is very well thinkable that 
with the regression of the sexual hunger to earlier stages of 
development the level of the reality-sense that was dominant at the 
time of fixation also becomes renascent in the mechanisms of the 
symptom-formation. [...] Hysteria and the obsessional neurosis, for 
example, would according to this conception be characterised on the 
one hand by a regression of the sexual hunger to earlier stages of 
development (auto-erotism, Oedipusism), and on the other hand in 
their mechanisms by a relapse of the reality-sense to the stage of 
magic gestures (conversion) or of magic thoughts (omnipotence of 
thought). I repeat: It will need much longer laborious work before the 
fixation-points of all neuroses can be established with certainty’ 
(Ferenczi, 1952, pp. 234–5, my italics). 
 
In a letter to Karl Abraham, Freud makes it clear that regression was a concept 
inherited from ‘the evolution and involution of the English authors’ (Freud, letter from 
26 July 1907, italics in English in the original), that is, Jackson and Spencer. Earlier, 
in his monograph on aphasias, he had already acknowledged the influence of the 
English neurologist:  
 
‘In assessing the functions of the speech apparatus under pathological 
conditions we are adopting as a guiding principle Hughlings Jackson’s 
doctrine that all these modes of reaction represent instances of 
functional retrogression (Rückbildung, disinvolution) of a highly 
organized apparatus, and therefore correspond to previous states of its 
functional development. This means that under all circumstances an 
arrangement of association which, having been acquired later, belongs 
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to a higher level of functioning, will be lost, while an earlier and simpler 
one will be preserved’ (Freud, 1891, p. 87)6. 
 
Building on these elements, we can trace some parallels between Freud’s models of 
the mind and Jackson’s model of the nervous system. Like Jackson, Freud, in his 
topographic model, which he later developed in the structural model, has described 
the mind as operating in three hierarchical levels, evolved out of the subject’s own 
ontogeny (personal history), as well as out of its phylogeny (history of the species). 
Like Jackson, Freud places consciousness, and later the ego, in the highest layer, 
controlling and inhibiting excitation from the lower levels. The highest layer in both 
authors servers not only to control and inhibit excitations from bottom levels, but has 
also the additional task of unifying what are at the lower levels completely 
uncoordinated stimuli. In fact, in both authors this unification is achieved via the 
mechanism of inhibition, i.e., unification is the goal, and inhibition is the mechanism 
by which the mind or brain achieves it. Like Jackson, Freud claimed that disorders of 
consciousness ‘released’ phylogenetically older and more primitive processes to 
appear. For a long time, Jackson even claimed that just as the highest level of the 
nervous system has a mental concomitant (consciousness), so the lower levels must 
also have one (an “unconscious consciousness”) – a view he would come to 
disregard as incoherent (G.K. York & Steinberg, 1993). More than simply parallels, 
the correspondences in the models of the two authors indicate a strong influence, 
                                                          
6
 Freud provided no references to Jackson here. He mentions Jackson again on pages 61 and 88, but only on 
page 56 does he make reference to a specific article: “On Affections of Speech from Diseases of the Brain” (J. 
H. Jackson, 1878). This is the only piece we can know with certainty that was read by Freud. He again quotes 
the same paper in his metapsychological essay on “The Unconscious”, from 1915 (p.206). Further mentions to 
Jackson are also present – without specific references – in “On the Psychical Mechanism of Hysterical 
Phenomena: A Lecture” (Freud, 1893, p. 35) and “The Interpretation of Dreams” (Freud, 1900, p. 568). 
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specially taking into consideration Freud’s understanding of the general anatomy of 
the brain.  
As historian Roger Smith demonstrated in his thorough account of the uses of the 
notion of Inhibition in the sciences of the mind and the brain, the notion was ‘Insert 
discussion on inhibition in 19th century neuropsychiatry here. Roger Smith 1992. 
On the subject of mind-brain relation, Freud explicitly follows Jackson’s so-called 
“Doctrine of Concomitance” in ‘On Aphasia’. The doctrine is a type of psychophysical 
parallelism which aimed at separating the realms of psychology and physiology, and 
so liberated neurologists from the widely speculative task of looking for the location 
of psychical events in the brain, opening the way for a pure physiological neurology. 
According to the doctrine, brain and mind operate completely correlated, but causally 
unrelated – like two clocks initially set to the same time:  
 
‘The doctrine I hold is: first, that states of consciousness (or, 
synonymously, states of mind) are utterly different from nervous states; 
second, that the two things occur together – that for every mental state 
there is a correlative nervous state; third, that, although the two things 
occur in parallelism, there is no interference of one with the other. This 
may be called the doctrine of Concomitance’ (Jackson, 1884: 72).  
 
Freud’s position as presented in ‘On Aphasias’ is remarkably similar, as a number of 
scholars (Fullinwider, 1983; Makari, 2008; Solms & Saling, 1986, 1990; Stengel, 
1963) have already observed: 
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‘The relationship between the chain of physiological events in the 
nervous system and the mental processes is probably not one of cause 
and effect. The former do not cease when the latter set in; they tend to 
continue, but, form a certain moment, a mental phenomenon 
corresponds to each part of the chain, or to several parts. The psychic 
is, therefore, a process parallel to the physiological, “a dependent 
concomitant”’ (1891, p. 55, italics in English in the original).  
 
The Doctrine of Concomitance played an essential role in the creation of 
psychoanalysis. It allowed Freud to develop a pure psychology separated from 
physiology – but one that paralleled its models. After his monograph on the 
aphasias, he tried to develop a physiologico-speculative model of the whole brain 
that explained his clinical cases (i.e., the Project). As he realised that he would not 
achieve his initial aims, he gave up the project and progressively moved over to the 
field of psychology, until, in 1900, in The Interpretation of Dreams, he wrote the 
famous passage that consolidates the arrival of psychoanalysis:  
 
‘I shall entirely disregard the fact that the mental apparatus with which 
we are here concerned is also known to us in the form of an anatomical 
preparation, and I shall carefully avoid the temptation to determine 
psychical locality in any anatomical fashion. I shall remain upon 
psychological ground, and I propose simply to follow the suggestion 
that we should picture the instrument which carries out our mental 
functions as resembling a compound microscope or a photographic 
apparatus, or something of the kind’ (Freud 1900, p. 536). 
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Hughlings Jackson and MacLean’s Triune Brain Theory 
 
Hughlings Jackson’s insights on the evolutionary hierarchy of the brain have also 
had a strong impact in the emerging neurosciences, both in Europe and in America 
(Joynt, 1989; Wallesch, 1989). For instance, the founder of the neurological clinic 
that would later become the Department of Neurology at Harvard Medical School, 
James Jackson Putnam (1846-1918), studied and worked with Hughlings Jackson, 
who was a lasting influence throughout his life (Joynt, 1989). Perhaps not 
coincidentally, Putnam became later in his life an enthusiast of psychoanalysis, 
being instrumental in organising Freud’s visit to the United States in 1909. Their 
meet during the visit led to a personal friendship, developed via multiple letters 
(Putnam, 1971), and subsequently to the formation of the American Psychoanalytic 
Association, of which Putnam was a founding member. Further, as Roger Smith 
explored at length, the Jacksonian evolutionary understanding of the brain was 
deeply impactful in British neurology and psychiatry, being a major influence to 
authors such as David Ferrier, Sherrington, Henry Head, Maudsley, and Rivers 
(Roger smith, 1982, p. 163ff.).  
There is not enough space, nor is my goal here, to develop a complete account of 
the impact of Jackson’s work for neurology and the neurosciences. The aim in this 
last section is simply to schematically describe a parallel branch of the 
neurosciences in the 20th century that converges again with psychoanalytic ideas in 
the present, particularly in the field of neuropsychoanalysis. As we will see, he was 
an inspiration to researchers – especially of emotions –, who thought of the brain as 
hierarchically organised by evolution. 
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In a 1937 paper, the American comparative brain anatomist James Papez (1883-
1958) relied heavily on Jackson’s evolutionary ideas to outline a circuit that 
accounted for emotion. He hypothesised that the hippocampus, the cingulate girus, 
the hypothalamus, the anterior thalamic nuclei, and the connections between these 
structures formed ‘a harmonious mechanism which may elaborate the functions of 
central emotion, as well as participate in emotional expression’ (Papez 1937, p. 743). 
A similar structure to the one referred to by Papez had already been described in 
1878 by the French anatomist Paul Broca, who coined the term le grande lobe 
limbique to describe the circular edge or border (Latin limbus) structure that 
surrounded the lower threshold of the hemispheres. Broca, however, established no 
connections between the area and emotion, believing instead the structure to be 
associated primarily with the sense of smell – as the term rhinencephalon 
(rhino=nose), which is sometimes used synonymously with the limbic system, implies 
(Finger, 2001, p. 286ff). It would fall to the American neuroanatomist Paul MacLean 
(1913-2007), who had previously studied with Papez, to bring back the usage of the 
term in a paper from 1952. MacLean called it “the limbic system” while expanding the 
structure to also contain the hippocampal gyri, the amygdala, the septal nuclei, the 
epithalamus, parts of the basal ganglia and several nuclei of the hypothalamus 
(MacLean, 1952, 1990).  
Perhaps not by accident, MacLean belongs to a line of scientists, in which we can 
also place Hughlings Jackson and Freud, that moved to the field of neuroscience 
only after long contemplating a career in philosophy. In his writings, MacLean 
demonstrated an inclination to speculative work characteristic of a philosopher. 
MacLean described the brain as a conglomerate of three hierarchical structures or 
semi-independent brains, which he called, progressively, the reptilian or visceral 
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brain7, the old (or paleo-) mammalian brain, and the new (or neo-) mammalian brain. 
The reptilian brain, located in the brainstem, was considered responsible for instincts 
and stereotypical behaviour. The middle level, composed of the limbic system, was 
responsible for emotional expression, simple feelings, and reproductive behaviour. 
The paleo-mammalian brain was formed by the neocortex and represented the 
source of higher thoughts, of problem-solving, reason and verbal language. 
Not accidentally, MacLean’s triune brain theory shows direct correspondence to 
Jackson’s model. The English neurologist was always a strong influence, being the 
most quoted author in the best-selling book The Triune Brain in Evolution (1990), in 
which MacLean says that his ‘argument is in line with Hughlings Jackson’s classical 
concept that the nervous system represents a hierarchy of levels and that a loss of 
structures at higher levels gives release to the activity of those at lower levels’ (1990: 
59).  
A further feature of the triune brain theory – and one that was already present, even 
though less explicitly, in Jackson – is that the different layers of the brain are 
potentially in conflict as they are unable to communicate effectively with one another. 
The causes are chemical, anatomical and functional. First, since each level operates 
via a different set of neurochemistry, they function as partially independent brains.  
Secondly, the lack of major associative pathways between the component brains 
extends the possible miscommunication. Third, MacLean believed that because only 
the neocortex is capable of using symbolic language, that puts it in a special position 
in relation to the other two layers, which in turn generated a ‘conflict between what 
we feel and what we know’ (MacLean, 1977: 214). In this model, only the 
                                                          
7
 In later works (P. MacLean, 1990), MacLean changed the name of the first structure to ‘protoreptilian 
Complex’ or ‘R-Complex’ to acknowledge the recent discoveries that mammals did not descend directly from 
reptiles, but from mammal-like reptiles (the therapsids) – a common ancestor to both mammals and reptiles. 
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neomammalian cortex ‘looks inward to the inside world’, so that ‘this new 
development makes possible the insight required for the foresight to plan for the 
needs of others as well as self’ (MacLean, 1977: 214). And in a tone that strongly 
reminds us of the Freudian Superego, ‘this added dimension has ironically increased 
the suffering that we feel when torn by conflict between our own selfish concerns and 
concern for others’ (ibid., p.217-8).  
The similarity between his model and Freud’s did not go unnoticed to MacLean, who 
quoted Freud when talking about duality and conflict, as well as in his paper on the 
evolution of psychosexual functions in the brain  (Maclean 1977, p.218; Maclean 
1994, p.111). MacLean even identifies the Id with the reptilian brain at points and, in 
a commentary to the Psychoanalytic Quarterly, he declared his hopes that “just as 
the physicist feels assured when he can correlate observable events with the 
movement of electrons which he cannot see, so it is reassuring to us that we are 
getting nearer the day when we shall be able to correlate the profound, though 
intangible, insights of Freudian psychology with brain structure and brain function” 
(1953, p. 53).  
Given the prominence of psychoanalytic thinking in the mid-20th century, it is no 
wonder the American anatomist would be somewhat familiar with Freudian ideas. 
However, it is also worth noting that MacLean worked with Karl H. Pribram (1919-
2015), with whom he published two papers early in his career (Maclean & Pribram, 
1953; Pribram & Maclean, 1953). Pribram was a Viennese-born  American 
neuroscientist who also wrote extensively on psychoanalytic theory (Pribram, 1962, 
1965, 1981, 1989, 1998; Pribram & Gill., 1976). In fact, the two shared a lifelong 
professional dispute and personal friendship, described in Pribram’s exposé on his 
relationship with MacLean. Pribram compared their relationship to that of Pasteur-
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Koch and Freud-Jung, with the difference that ‘in the MacLean-Pribram adventures 
[…] Paul, through his charm and graciousness, has made it possible for us to remain 
friends despite what have often been painful differences’ (Pribram, 2002, p. 7). 
Curiously, however, MacLean’s work was never taken up by psychoanalysis but for 
few exceptions without further any substancial impact on to psychoanalytic theory. 
Despite its popularity, the triune brain theory faced much controversy from the 
neuroscience community8, never having been widely accepted, except in some 
circles – and even then only cautiously. One of these was the new field of Affective 
Neuroscience, a meanwhile established field in the neurosciences.  
 
From the Triune Brain to Panksepp’s Affective Neuroscience  
 
Following the path laid by Jackson and MacLean, Jaak Panksepp (b.1943), the 
Estonian-born pioneer in the field of affective neuroscience, also again proposed a 
tripartite hierarchical model of the brain. As with his predecessors, the different 
hierarchies are representative of different stages of evolution. In his seminal textbook 
‘Affective Neuroscience’ (1998), Panksepp discloses his debt to the triune brain 
theory: ‘many others along the way have helped me better understand the nature of 
emotions and the nature of scientific enterprise that must be pursued in order to 
understand the deep, neurological nature of human emotionality. Foremost among 
those have been the writings of Maclean’ (p.ix). 
                                                          
8
 For criticisms, see (Reiner, 1990), (Campbell, 1992) and (Butler & Hodos, 2005). For a review of the criticisms, 
with replies, see (Cory Jr., 2002). 
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Panksepp’s model, in fact, is better understood as an expansion on MacLean’s – but 
with some caution regarding the some anatomical inaccuracies present in the 
previous model. On the triune brain theory, Panksepp says that ‘this three-layered 
conceptualization helps us grasp the overall function of higher brain areas better 
than any other scheme yet devised. Of course, exceptions can be found to all 
generalizations, and it must be kept in mind that the brain is a massively 
interconnected organ whose every part can find an access pathway to any other 
part’ (ibid., p.70). However inaccurate in its details, for Panksepp the triune brain still 
represents a powerful tool for a macro understanding of brain architecture and its 
functioning and development: ‘although the triune brain is largely a didactic 
simplification from a neuroanatomical point of view, it is an informative perspective. 
There appears to have been relatively long periods of stability in vertebrate brain 
evolution, followed by bursts of expansion’ (ibid., p.43). MacLean received 
Panksepp’s work well (P. MacLean, 2001). 
The model is constructed on the notion of ‘nested hierarchies’, where lower functions 
are ‘embedded and re-represented in higher brains functions, which yield not only 
traditional bottom-up controls but also top-down regulators of emotionality’ 
(Panksepp & Biven, 2012, p. 77). It is worth noting that although Panksepp does not 
seem to acknowledge the influence of Jackson in his writings, even the terminology 
used is equivalent to that of Jackson, who first thought of the upper levels as 
representing and re-representing lower strata (1932, p. 104ff.). And even though 
Panksepp places less emphasis than MacLean on the conflict generated by 
communication between levels, especially considering that his work is strongly 
focused on the lower level and its forms of bottom-up control of the brain, he 
recognises that such a hierarchical structure provides ‘two-way avenues of control 
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that can be seen to be forms of “circular causality” that respects the brain as a fully 
integrated organ that can have dramatic intra-psychic conflicts’ (Panksepp & Biven, 
2012, p. 77) 
The bottom level, responsible for ‘primary-process’ or ‘basic affects’, is situated very 
low and medial in the brain and is shared with all mammals, which affirms its ancient 
nature in brain evolution. It manifests, according to Panksepp, ‘evolutionary 
memories’ (ibid., p.13) that are the basic affective operating systems of the brain. 
These were built, he says, from ‘earlier reflexive-instinctual abilities’ (Panksepp, 
1998, p. 50), which, through evolutionary modification and coordination of pre-
existing capabilities, provided the animal with ’greater behavioural coherence and 
flexibility in a variety of primal situations’. The basic systems are subdivided into 
three general types of affect: 1) sensory affects (pleasant-unpleasant feelings), 2) 
homeostatic affects (hunger, thirst, thermoregulation, etc.), and 3) emotional affects 
(emotion action systems). Panksepp further breaks down the emotional affects in 
seven basic action systems for coordinating emotionality in the brain of mammals (cf. 
Panksepp, 1998; Panksepp & Biven, 2012). These can be thought of as “survival 
tools” that regulate: foraging for resources (SEEKING), reproductive eroticism 
(LUST), protection of the body (FEAR and RAGE), maternal devotion (CARE), 
separation distress (PANIC/GRIEF), and vigorous positive engagement with 
conspecifics (PLAY). The affect designators of the seven system are written in upper 
case letter to differentiate them from our simple vernacular folk psychology. These 
refer instead to specific neural systems that are assumed to be a major source for 
the emergence of the vernacular terminologies but which are in this context 
restricted to its neuro-functional referent (Panksepp, 1998, p. 51). 
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The next layer, of secondary-process emotions, based on the basal ganglia, is 
responsible for three types of basic learning mechanisms in the forms of classical 
conditioning, instrumental and operant conditioning, as well as emotional habits. In a 
way that strongly reminds us of the Freudian theory of learning presented in the 
Project, Tthese mechanisms for learning can link external perceptions with 
associated feelings, thus generating a top-down control of basic affects on the 
grounds of previous experience. On top, we find the tertiary level, which is 
programmed by life experiences through the neocortex, engendering our higher 
cognitive processes such as thinking, ruminating, and planning. Although the 
neocortex in healthy development becomes the dominating level in adulthood, it is 
the ‘ancient feeling states [that] help forge our memories in the first place. New 
memories could not emerge without the underlying states that allow animals to 
experience the intrinsic values of life’ (Panksepp & Biven, 2012, p. 66). 
It is this framework, developed in the 80’s and 90’s via evidence gathered primarily 
from comparative neuroanatomy and experiments on electrical stimulation of the 
brain of mammals (in particular rats), that became the initial foundation for Mark 
Solms’ (and later Panksepp’s) attempt at joining psychoanalysis and neuroscience 
together (Panksepp & Solms, 2012; Solms, 2000b; Solms & Panksepp, 2012; Solms 
& Turnbull, 2002; Zellner et al., 2011). This was based on identifying Panksepp’s 
primary process emotional action systems as an updated and more accurate version 
of the Freudian drives, which still maintained some of its essential elements and 
general organisation – such as that of an evolutionarily constructed tripartite model 
of the brain and mind: 
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Viewing Freudian drive theory from the perspective of affective 
neuroscience, we are sure we are not alone in suggesting that the 
equivalent of Freud's libidinal drive at the instinctual level is the 
SEEKING system, the most basic emotion command system in 
Panksepp's taxonomy. The general pleasure-seeking tendency of the 
libidinal drive, which has a source and an aim but is inherently without 
an object, seems to correlate remarkably well with the ‘objectless’ 
action tendencies that Panksepp attributes to the SEEKING system. 
This system is an all-purpose system, activated by a variety of needs, 
that energizes forward-moving, foraging, and effortful behaviour aimed 
at any number of goals, rewards, or objects. (Solms & Zellner, 2012) 
 
The goal of course is not simply to provide “hard science” evidence to Freud’s 
concepts or to map them to the brain, but also to extend and correct psychoanalytic 
knowledge of the underpinnings of our subjective experience based on 
methodologies considered more appropriate for the task. The question of how many 
drives there are and how they relate to one another has been the subject of 
extensive debate in psychoanalysis at least since Freud’s early disputes with Jung 
(Makari, 2008). In some contemporary psychoanalytic schools, the notion of drive 
disappeared altogether. Neuropsychoanalysis, at least in the version exemplified by 
the work of Mark Solms, operates in the belief that Panksepp’s taxonomies of drives 
provides a more accurate description. Thus it is argued that:  
 
A reworking of drive and motivational theory in psychoanalysis, away 
from an outdated and clumsily mechanistic dual-drive theory (which 
does not adequately conceptualize fundamental social connection 
needs) towards a more multifactorial and multi-axial theory of 
motivation and affect would significantly reduce metapsychological 
36 
 
sources of potential confusion in the clinical practice of psychoanalysis 
and bring psychoanalysis more fully into register with moderate 
neuroscience findings. (Watt, 2012) 
 
Neuropsychoanalysis in this sense reformulates Freud’s original taxonomy of life and 
death drives into a more complex one, where libidinal drives (SEEKING, LUST) 
coexist alongside social (CARE, PLAY) and negative drives (RAGE, FEAR). A 
deeper understanding of these underlying motivational systems provides us with 
improved accounts not only of their basic elements, as well as with their interactions 
(as the systems interact with one another in excitatory and/or inhibitory ways) – and 
subsequently of psychopathologies and treatment. 
 
Tripartite Structures 
 
The account presented here sheds some light on the similarities encountered by 
neuropsychoanalytic researchers between contemporary accounts of the anatomy 
and physiology of the nervous systems on the one hand, and of Freudian models of 
the mind at the other. These, I tried to demonstrate, are more than similarities. They 
have a historical underpinning to them, as both accounts originate from one common 
source: John Hughlings Jackson’s tripartite evolutionary hierarchic view of the brain. 
Tripartite structures were new to neither Freud nor Jackson. Throughout the last two 
and a half millennia authors have attempted to explain our conflictual nature in 
models of three elements that compose our sense of agency. After delving into 
tripartite structures of the brain in Spencer and Jackson (Smith, 1982a, 1982b), the 
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historian CUM Smith extended his research to the origins of tripartite structures of 
the mind and soul in antiquity. There, he argues that such models have been present 
in wWestern cCivilization since classic Greece, and that it may be time to overcome 
them:  
 
‘It is thus not surprising to find that tripartite classifications crop up time 
and again in the history of neuropsychology’. […] ‘It may be [...] that the 
Western mind has been conditioned to accept tripartite schematics by 
its millennial experience of tripartite social stratifications. Perhaps it is 
now time to discard such age-old and nowadays unconvincing 
analogies and acknowledge that the brain and the mind have a far 
more intricate dynamic.’ (Smith, 2010).  
 
This is a plausible hypothesis. A range of authors, from Plato (cf. Republic, Book IV) 
to Panksepp, passing through Jackson, Freud, MacLean and others9, have indicated 
our condition as one of conflict between essentially three parts that compose our 
subjectivity. One could argue, with Smith, that these authors were culturally 
conditioned to choosing the number three. Based on what we have seen, however, 
another hypothesis presents itself with equal credibility. As Affective Neuroscience 
seems to indicate, it is possible to speculate that what different authors identified as 
tripartite structures of the soul, mind or spirit, may in fact be different analogies that 
reflect something structural in the evolutionary history of the architecture of our 
nervous system.  
                                                          
9
 A full list would be too large and outside of the purpose. But it includes authors in ancient philosophy (from 
Plato and Aristotle to Galen), Christian theology (the separation of body, soul and spirit), philosophy 
(Mendelssohn (1755) for instance, divided the human psyche into cognition, affection and conation), 
psychology (Pavlov's division into second signalling systems, conditioned reflexes, and unconditioned reflexes), 
the neurosciences (as per Jackson, MacLean and Panksepp) and, of course, psychoanalysis. 
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